



Corporate Hedging in the Insurance
Industry: The Use of Financial





96-26-BTHE WHARTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTER
The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for
competitive excellence.  The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk
at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center.  The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as
they pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center.  If you would
like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please
let us know of your interest.
Anthony M. Santomero
Director
The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan FoundationCorresponding author: J. David Cummins, Wharton School, 3641 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA,
1
19104-6218, Phone: 215-898-5644, Fax:  215-898-0310, E-mail: Cummins@wharton.upenn.edu
J. David Cummins is the Harry J. Loman Professor of Insurance and Risk Management at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania and the Victor L. Andrews Visiting Scholar at Georgia State University. Richard D.
Phillips is Assistant Professor of Risk Management and Insurance and Research Associate in the Center for Risk
Management and Insurance Research at Georgia State University. Stephen D. Smith is the H. Talmage Dobbs, Jr.,
Chair of Finance at Georgia State University. All three authors are also Visiting Scholars at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Financial assistance from the Society of Actuaries (specific
groups within the Society of Actuaries included the Investment Section, the Finance Reporting Section, the
Committee on Knowledge Extension Research, the Committee on Financial Research, and the Committee on Life
Insurance Research), the Casualty Actuarial Society, Bankers Trust Inc., the Center for Risk Management and
Insurance Research at Georgia State University, and the Policy Research Center at Georgia State University is
gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments on this paper:
David Hall, Samuel Cox, Gregory Niehaus, Lucien Burnett, Martin Nance, Laura Benedict, Peter Hepokoski,
Stephen Reddy, Len Graus and Robert Reitano. The authors also thank Robert Klein, Michael Barth, and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners for their assistance in collecting the data. Any errors are, as usual,
our responsibility.
Corporate Hedging in the Insurance Industry:
The Use of Financial Derivatives by US Insurers
1
September 19, 1996
Abstract :  In this paper we investigate the extent to which insurance companies utilize
financial derivatives contracts in the management of risks. The data set we employ allows
us to observe the universe of individual insurer transactions for a class of contracts; namely
those normally thought of as off-balance-sheet (OBS). We provide information on the
number of insurers using various types of derivatives contracts and the volume of
transactions in terms of notional amounts and the number of counterparties. Life insurers
are most active in interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, while property-casualty
insurers tend to be active in trading equity option and foreign exchange contracts. Using a
multivariate probit analysis, we explore the factors that potentially influence the existence
of OBS activities. We also investigate questions relating to whether certain subsets of OBS
transactions (e.g., exchange traded) are related to such things as interest rate risk measures,
organizational form and other characteristics which may discriminate between desired
risk/return profiles across a cross-section of insurers. We find evidence consistent with the
use of derivatives by insurers to hedge risks posed by guaranteed investment contracts
(GICs), collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and other sources of financial risk.Corporate Hedging in the Insurance Industry:
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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the extent to which insurance companies utilize financial derivatives
contracts in the management of risks. The data set we employ allows us to observe the universe of
individual insurer transactions for a class of contracts; namely those normally thought of as off-
balance-sheet (OBS). We provide information on the number of insurers using various types of
derivatives contracts and the volume of transactions in terms of notional amounts and the number of
counterparties. Life insurers are most active in interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, while
property-casualty insurers tend to be active in trading equity option and foreign exchange contracts.
Using a multivariate probit analysis, we explore the factors that potentially influence the existence of
OBS activities. We also investigate questions relating to whether certain subsets of OBS transactions
(e.g., exchange traded) are related to such things as interest rate risk measures, organizational form
and other characteristics which may discriminate between desired risk/return profiles across a cross-
section of insurers. We find evidence consistent with the use of derivatives by insurers to hedge risks
posed by guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and
other sources of financial risk.
1. Introduction
The world of insurance has become a risky one. Insurers are facing increasing intra-industry
competition as well as more intensive competition from other financial institutions such as banks and
mutual funds. In response, insurers have developed a number of increasingly complex products and
at the same time have had to reduce the profit loadings in these products in order to compete in the
marketplace. In addition, the internationalization of financial markets has exposed insurers to stiffer
competition from foreign firms and to levels and types of risks that were not present in the recent
past. Add to this the historically high volatility in the prices of financial assets we have witnessed in
1the past quarter century and it is not surprising that insurance company managers are worried about
financial risk.
Financial reporting and regulatory requirements also have made insurers more sensitive to the
risks inherent in their asset and liability portfolios. The most prominent changes have been the
adoption of risk-based capital requirements, Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 115, requiring
mark-to-market accounting for fixed income securities held in the “trading” or “available for sale”
categories and FAS 119, requiring disclosure of the purpose of derivative transactions.
This changing market and regulatory environment has led insurers to explore new techniques
for managing their asset and liability risk, without sacrificing income. Many insurers have turned to
financial derivatives to manage risk and enhance income. The market for financial derivatives has
grown rapidly over the past two decades and now offers a wide variety of contracts to manage nearly
all types of financial exposures. The contracts range from standardized derivatives that are traded
on organized exchanges to individually tailored, over-the-counter (OTC) contracts created for a buyer
by a derivatives dealer.
l
The growth in derivatives markets has greatly expanded the risk management opportunity set
available to insurers and other investors. However, following the recent well-publicized derivatives-
related losses of Orange County California, Procter & Gamble, Gibson Greetings, and Barings Bank,
derivatives have also become controversial, leading to more intensive scrutiny of derivatives practices
by both state and Federal regulators.
   1Some derivatives transactions, such as futures or forward contracts, do not directly create assets or liabilities on
insurer balance sheet, but rather generate (sometimes contingent) cash flows. Hence, derivatives are often referred to as off-
balance-sheet (OBS) contracts.
2Against this backdrop, it seems particularly important to understand the level and types of
derivatives transactions that are currently being undertaken by insurers. However, the existing
information on insurer derivatives activity is mostly anecdotal, and no comprehensive analysis of
usage by insurers has yet been conducted. The purpose of the present paper is to remedy this
deficiency in the existing literature by providing a detailed statistical analysis of the use of derivatives
by U.S. life and property-casualty insurers. In addition to providing data on the extent of insurer
activities, we also investigate the factors that influence the participation decisions of life and
property/casualty insurers in the financial derivatives market. This information should prove useful
to insurers that are present or potential participants in derivatives markets as well as to regulators
concerned about the potential misuse of OBS contracts.
To conduct this study, we take advantage of the detailed disclosure requirements imposed on
insurers by state regulators that provide information on individual holdings and transactions in
derivatives markets. Specifically, we use data from Schedule DB of the 1994 annual statements of
all U.S. insurers reporting to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Our data
analysis provides, among other things, information on the number of insurers that are actively trading
various types of derivatives contracts. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which holds that the vast
majority of insurers active in derivatives are life insurers, we find that approximately equal numbers
of life and property-casualty insurers are active in derivatives markets. We also provide information
on the types of contracts that are most frequently traded by insurers and the volume of derivatives
transactions. Finally, Probit analysis is employed in order to examine the determinants of derivatives
market participation by insurers. We are able to consider questions such as what type of insurers are
likely to use various types of derivatives contracts and for what purpose -- hedging financial risks,
3hedging underwriting exposure, or pursuing trading profits uncorrelated with underlying economic
activities. We build on earlier work that has presented evidence on the participation decision by banks
(Sinkey and Carter, 1995, Gunther and Siems, 1995), life insurers (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1995), and
nonfinancial firms (Fenn, Post and Sharpe, 1996, Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993).
The discussion proceeds as follows: In section 2, we provide an overview of some basic
reasons why insurers might wish to employ OBS contracts, and briefly reviews the prior literature on
the use of derivatives by financial institutions. Section 3 describes the data base and presents statistics
on the number of insurers using derivatives, the volume of those transactions, and statistics on
counterparty exposure. Section 4 provides a brief summary of the prior literature on the determinants
of corporate hedging and outlines our hypotheses. The determinants of derivatives usage are
analyzed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2. Background: Derivatives and Financial Risk Management
The Need for Financial Risk Management
Insurers serve two primary functions in the economy -- (a) a risk-bearing and risk-pooling
function and (b) financial intermediation. In their risk-bearing and risk-pooling function, insurers
provide a mechanism for individuals and businesses exposed to the risk of loss of life, health, or
property to transfer these risks to an insurer in return for a premium payment. The insurer can
diversify most of this risk (usually called underwriting risk) by writing insurance on large numbers
of policyholders (the risk-pooling function), whose risk of loss is more or less statisticallyindependent. However, diversification does not fully eliminate underwriting risk, giving rise to
the need for insurers to hedge this risk.
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The other important economic function performed by insurers is financial intermediation.
Financial intermediation involves raising funds by issuing specialized types of debt contracts and
investing the funds in financial assets. Although financial intermediation would not be needed if
financial markets were complete and frictionless, market imperfections, incompleteness, and gains
from specialization in certain types of financial transactions give intermediaries economic value.
Intermediaries typically are compensated for their services in the form of yield spreads, i.e., they
pay less for the funds they borrow than they earn on the funds they lend or invest.
The debt instruments issued by property-casualty insurance companies are insurance
policies covering various types of risks such as automobile accidents, fires, work accidents, and
lawsuits arising from defective products, professional malpractice, etc. The funds raised are
invested primarily in traded bonds and stocks. Life insurers raise funds by issuing various types of
products such as cash value life insurance, annuities, and guaranteed investment contracts (GICs).
Like property-casualty insurers, they also invest in traded bonds and stocks, but life insurers are
also major participants in the markets for privately placed bonds and mortgages.
The intermediation function of insurers gives rise to the majority of their need for financial
risk management. One reason that this need arises is because the cash flows of the liabilities
2Although reinsurance is still the predominant means of hedging underwriting risk, a derivatives market in
underwriting risk has begun to emerge. The first exchange-traded insurance derivatives are the catastrophe insurance futures
and options introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1992-1993. These contracts have not traded very widely
to date, although trading volume has been increasing steadily since a new sequence of contracts was introduced in the Fall
of 1995. Insurance derivatives are likely to become very important in the future, expanding the industry’s capacity to bear
risk and smoothing out cyclical price fluctuations (for a discussion see Cummins and Geman, 1995). However, in the present
paper we focus on financial derivatives.
5issued by insurers have different patterns and characteristics than the cash flows of the assets they
invest in. This difference in asset and liability cash flows is in fact part of the definition of
financial intermediation. An example is a portfolio of liability insurance policies, where the cash
flows represent payments of liability judgments to claimants. This cash flow pattern is likely to
differ from the cash flows of conventional assets such as bonds or stocks. Contracts with unusual
cash flow patterns in life insurance include universal life, where policyholders have a great deal of
discretion over the premiums contributed, variable life insurance and annuities, which are linked to
equity indices or portfolios, single premium deferred annuities, and guaranteed investment
contracts (GICs). These contracts typically were created to meet the needs of a particular class of
investor and exist precisely because (and only as long as) the insurer has a comparative advantage
in creating an asset portfolio which delivers the promised policy cash flows without exposing
policyholders to unacceptable levels of risk. Creating these types of asset portfolios requires
financial risk management.
Probably the most important of the more complex financial risk management tasks faced
by both life and property-casualty insurers is to manage the duration and convexity of their asset
portfolios and to manage relationship between the duration and convexity of assets and the
duration and convexity of liabilities.
liability management (ALM).
3
This latter type of risk management is known as asset-
31ntuitively, duration is the sensitivity of the price of an asset to a change in interest rates, e.g., the percentage
decline in the value of a bond in response to a specified percentage change in interest rates. Convexity is the change in an
asset’s price sensitivity, i.e., duration, when rates change. Duration gives a good indication of how much an asset’s price
will change in response to a small change in the level of interest rates; but because of the existence of convexity (convexity
risk), duration does not give as good an approximation to the price change for relatively large changes in the level of interest
rates.
6The traditional ways to manage duration and convexity were by matching asset and
liability cash flows or through portfolio immunization, i.e., structuring asset portfolios so that the
durations of assets and liabilities were matched or at least managed to achieve organizational
objectives. However, this type of asset-liability management can involve a considerable amount
of trading and accompanying transactions costs. Financial derivatives often provide a cheaper
and/or more flexible way to manage duration and convexity risk. This type of hedge involves
simultaneously buying and/or selling various combinations of derivative contracts, such as swaps,
calls, and puts.
Hedging vs. Speculation
While insurers and other investors can use derivatives to hedge risk, they can also use
derivatives for income enhancement or “speculation.” There is some concern in the regulatory
community about the possibility that higher levels of derivatives activity may increase insurer
insolvency risk. While it is certainly possible to construct derivatives positions that would expose
insurers to significant amounts of risk, there are also income enhancement strategies such as
covered call strategies which are no more risky than more traditional investments such as stocks
and bonds.
4 Given the complexities of derivatives strategies and the dynamic nature of the
market, determination of the appropriate type and level of regulation is difficult. Considerations
include: derivative market reaction to regulations (i.e. creation of new derivatives to circumvent
4A covered call strategy is one where the holder of some underlying instrument (e.g., share in a stock) writes a call
option on that particular investment. This has the immediate effect of generating income for the insurer. If share prices stay
the same or decrease, the call is not exercised. If prices rise, the shares are “called away” from the writer, however, the
insurer can easily deliver the shares since it already owns them. The primary motivation for an insurer to undertake this
investment strategy is to enhance the income of the insurer by selling the possibility of the capital gain in the underlying asset.
7regulations), impact on the ability of insurers to manage its risks in an effective and efficient
manner, and the level of statutory reporting necessary to provide appropriate information to
investors and policyholders. For example, increased reporting of derivatives positions, by
improving Schedule DB and making the resulting information more conveniently available to
investors and policyholders, would enhance the role of market discipline in controlling insolvency
risk, and market forces are nearly always more effective than direct regulation.
3. The Use of Derivatives By Insurers
The Data
Our data on the use of derivatives by insurers come from Schedule DB of the 1994
regulatory annual statements filed by insurers with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. Parts A through D of Schedule DB list individual transactions across four
general categories of derivatives; (A) options, caps and floors owned, (B) options, caps and floors
written, (C) collar, swap and forward agreements, and (D) futures. In part E of schedule DB,
insurers are required to report their year-end counterparty exposure for all the contracts contained
in sections A through D. Part E is potentially important because insurers may have reasons to
engage in OBS activities during the year but to “clean out” their books for purposes of the annual
regulatory report, which reflects holdings and liabilities at year end.
The sample of insurers we analyze consisted initially of all life and property-casualty (PC)
companies that filed regulatory annual statements with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners for report-year 1994, a total of 1,760 life insurers and 2,707 PC insurers. Initial
screening resulted in the elimination of firms with zero or negative assets, premiums, or surplus(equity) and firms that lack adequate group affiliation identifiers. Although the screening criteria
resulted in the elimination of a large number of insurers, these are predominantly very small firms
that in the aggregate account for only 2.2 percent of industry assets. The final sample consists of
1,207 life insurers and 2,063 PC insurers. Many of these insurers are members of groups that
operate under common ownership. Because members of groups are likely to share common
financial strategies and, in many cases, common investment departments, we analyze firms at the
group level as well as the individual company level. The group/unaffiliated sample consists of
1,423 groups and unaffiliated single companies.
Extent of Derivatives Usage by Insurers
Number of Users. The numbers of insurers using derivatives, by industry and
organizational form, are shown in Table 1, which focuses on the use of derivatives by insurer size
quartile, where size is measured by total assets. The top part of the table shows the extent of
derivatives usage by life insurers, PC insurers and groups/unaffiliated singles. Insurers were
counted as derivatives users if they reported any derivatives activity in 1994 in Schedule DB of
the regulatory annual statement, either within-year transactions or end-of-year holdings. The table
reveals the familiar size skewness characteristic of derivatives usage by both life insurers (Colquitt
and Hoyt, 1995) and banks (Sinkey and Carter, 1995, Gunther and Siems, 1995). Less than 2
percent of the insurers in the smallest size quartile used derivatives in 1994. In the largest
quartile, derivative transactions were reported by 38 percent of life insurers, 20 percent of PC
insurers, and 35 percent of the groups and unaffiliated insurers.For the industry as a whole, derivatives use was reported by 12 percent of life insurers, 7
percent of PC insurers, and 12.5 percent of groups and unaffiliated single insurers. Although
derivatives usage in the PC industry is relatively low, the finding that 142 PC companies are active
in OBS securities is somewhat surprising, given the conventional view that derivatives activity is
confined almost exclusively to the life insurance industry. In fact, the number of PC insurers using
derivatives (142) is about the same as the number of life insurers (144).
The second panel of Table 1 shows that stock firms are more likely to use derivatives than
mutuals and reciprocals. In the life insurer sample, 16.4 percent of stock firms use derivatives,
compared with 6.7 percent of mutuals. For PC insurers, 9.5 percent of stocks use derivatives,
compared to 4.3 percent of mutuals. This is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis
(Mayers and Smith, 1988), that stocks engage in more complex activities on average and have
more need to hedge. It also could be consistent with more income enhancement transactions by
stock insurers.
Types of Contracts. Table 2 provides some summary statistics on year-end 1994 open
derivatives positions by type of contract for life and PC insurers combined. Table 2 provides
information on the number of insurers using each type of contract and the notional amounts of the
contracts.
5 Column 1 shows the various derivative contract types, while column 2 shows the
number of insurers holding this position at year end 1994. Columns 3 and 4 show the mean and
median notional amounts by insurers. Based on the number of users, swaps are clearly the most
popular type of contract used in the industry. Somewhat surprising is the relatively large number
5The notional value of an OBS contract is analogous to the par or face value of an underlying contract. It is
important to emphasize, however, that none (or at most, a small amount in the case of options) of this notional value changes
hands. It is used instead to calculate the cash flows that change hands.
10of insurers engaged in writing call options. Other positions with a relatively large amount of
activity are short and long futures, put options owned, forwards and caps. The mean number of
open positions significantly exceed the medians for nearly all contract types, indicating a
significant skewness in the data, with a few (fairly large) participants accounting for a
disproportionate share of end-of-year holdings.
Table 3 is similar to Table 2 but shows the total number of positions and their
corresponding notional values opened during 1994. These amounts are expected to be larger than
end-of-year holdings because many positions are opened and closed out during the same calendar
year. Based on positions opened during the year, writing call options accounts for the largest
amount of activity in terms of number of participants and positions taken during the year.
Forwards, swaps, and futures also account for significant intra-year volume in terms of both the
number of participants and the total notional values outstanding.
Underlying Assets. Tables 4 and 5, for life-health and property-liability insurers,
respectively, provide a more detailed picture of derivatives activity by breaking down year-end
positions by type of underlying asset as well as by type of derivative contract. Table 4 shows that
interest rate swaps, interest rate caps and floors, bond futures, and foreign currency forwards are
the most important types of derivatives for life insurers in terms of the number of users reporting
open positions at the end of the year. Thus, while interest rate swaps are the most prevalent year-
end position by life companies, a number of these institutions also engaged in interest rate risk
management via contracts with option-like characteristics. In contrast to life insurers, Table 5
shows that the most common activity for PC insurers is in foreign currency forward contracts and
the writing of equity call options. To the extent that PC companies face substantial foreign
11exchange exposure due to foreign based subsidiaries and/or the holding of foreign bonds or
equities, this result is not unexpected.
Tables 4a and 5a are similar to Tables 4 and 5 but show the number of derivatives
contracts opened by insurers during 1994. For life-health insurers, positions opened during the
year greatly exceed end-of-year holdings for bond calls written, long and short bond futures,
foreign currency forwards, and short foreign currency futures. For PC insurers, within-year
transactions significantly exceed year-end positions for equity calls written, foreign currency
swaps, short bond futures, and short equity futures. Short term hedging needs may account for
part or all of the volume differences in open vs. year-end positions.
6
Counterparty Exposure. It is also important to consider the counterparty exposure of
insurers. Credit risk may be higher for OTC counterparties than for exchanges, so a heavy
concentration of transactions in a few OTC counterparties could possibly expose insurers to
excessive credit risk.
Tables 6 and 7 show data on the counterparty concentration of insurer derivatives
transactions at year-end and on positions opened during 1994, respectively. The principal
measures of counterparty concentration used here are the mean and median number of
counterparties and the counterparty Herfindahl index, based on notional principle.
7 A high value
12of the Herfindahl index implies that an insurer has its transactions heavily concentrated among one
or a few counterparties, with the maximum value of 1 indicating concentration of all notional
principal in a single counterparty. Table 6 shows that the mean and median number of OTC
counterparties at year-end are 4.7 and 2.0, respectively, and the mean and median OTC
counterparty Herfindahl indices are 0.620 and 0.582, respectively. The within-year concentration
statistics lead to similar conclusions. Although concentration among exchange counterparties is
higher, it has been argued that credit risk is lower for exchange traded derivatives.
Tables 8 and 9 list the OTC counterparties used by insurers at year-end and during the
year, respectively. The counterparties are ranked in terms of the total notional amount
outstanding with insurers. The counterparty with the largest notional amount outstanding with
insurers at year-end is Goldman Sachs followed by other large U.S. investment banks such as
Morgan Guaranty, Bankers Trust, Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. A number of foreign
counterparties also appear on the list, such as Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank. The leading
dealers (as opposed to users) among U.S. insurers are General Reinsurance Financial and
American International Group (AIG). The within-year concentration by counterparty appears
much higher than the year-end concentration, but this is primarily due to transactions by
Prudential Bache for a handful of insurers.
Table 10 shows concentration of insurer notional derivative values among organized
exchanges. The CBOT is the leading exchange in terms of notional principal transactions for
insurers, accounting for 89 percent of within-year notional principal and for 61 percent of year-
number of counterparties. The statistic is calculated for each active insurer.
13end notional principal. The difference between the within-year and year-end values for the CBOT
is primarily attributable to bond calls written by life insurers.
The above discussion is intended to provide some insight into the extent and composition
of derivatives usage by insurers. In the next section we employ some formal statistical tests in an
attempt to isolate the insurer specific factors that play a role in determining whether an insurer is
likely to engage in various off balance sheet activities.
4. Determinants of Derivatives Usage: Prior Research and Hypotheses
Prior Research
A number of empirical studies of the determinants of derivatives usage by financial
institutions have been conducted in recent years, including Kim and Koppenhaver (1992),
Venkatachalam (1995), Sinkey and Carter (1995) and Colquitt and Hoyt (1995), among others.
8
These papers investigate a number of hypotheses about the use of derivatives including the issue
of whether derivatives are used for hedging or income enhancement.
Kim and Koppenhaver consider the characteristics that are associated with swap market
participation by a sample of banks from the mid 1980’s to the early 1990’s. They find that much
of the notional values in swaps is explained by dealer, as opposed to position, activities.
Moreover, while dealer driven participation is directly related to capitalization levels, they find
that the level of notional values is inversely related to capitalization levels. They argue that these
results make sense to the extent that market discipline would require dealers to have relatively
8Fenn, Post and Sharpe (1996) study the use of derivatives by non-financial firms and find that such firms use swaps
to protect against fluctuations in debt financing costs due to changes in interest rates.
14large capital ratios for protection against default risk, while for users the higher capital levels act
as a substitute for other risk reduction activities such as interest rate swaps.
Gunther and Siems (1995), using more recent (early 1990s) data on banks, concluded
capitalization levels are related to the extent of derivatives usage, but not to the decision
concerning whether to participate in derivatives markets. They found that highly capitalized
that
banks tend to use derivatives to a greater extent than banks with weaker capital positions. The
authors point out that this could be consistent with banks using derivatives for income enhancing
(“speculative”) activities, with market discipline and/or regulation constraining weaker banks’
participation. Alternatively, it could suggest that highly capitalized banks use derivatives to hedge
unwanted risk.
Gunther and Siems also report that their measure of interest rate risk exposure, the
absolute value of the difference in the value of assets and liabilities repricing or maturing within
one to five years divided by total assets, is actually inversely related to the use of non-swap
derivatives. While the authors interpret this result as evidence of speculative activities by banks in
OBS contracts, their dependent variable excludes interest rate swap positions, which would
logically be a superior instrument for hedging intermediate term interest rate risk than the short-
dated exchange traded contracts that define their dependent variable. Indeed, Kim and
Koppenhaver (1992) provide evidence that this same interest rate risk measure is positively
related to swap activities, conditional on variables that account for non-swap derivatives
activities.
Gunther and Siems also find that banks whose debt financing includes high levels of
subordinated claims (notes and debentures) relative to assets engage in higher levels of OBS
15activity than banks with less subordinated debt. The positive association between subordinated
claims and derivatives usage provides evidence that, from a regulatory perspective, more highly
capitalized banks are more likely to engage in OBS activities. This follows from the fact that a
certain percentage of subordinated debt claims are allowed to be counted as capital for purposes
of determining risk-based capital ratios for banks.
Venkatachalam (1995) reports that while, on average, derivatives are used for hedging
fluctuations in bank equity prices, a significant percentage of the firms in his sample appear to
display a positive partial correlation between changes in the value of equity and changes in the
value of their OBS positions. Our approach to looking into the question of hedging vs.
“speculative” activities partly involves a decomposition of certain OBS positions into those
associated with the purchase of volatility vs. its sale. In particular, we are able to isolate some
factors influencing insurers to purchase options, caps and floors vs. writing these same contracts.
This approach has the advantage of being able to directly measure whether insurers are writing
volatility protection for others vs. hedging their own cash flows.
The literature on insurer participation in derivatives markets is much more limited than
that concerning banks. Colquitt and Hoyt (CH) (1995) investigate the determinants of the use of
futures and options by life insurers. They find that large insurers are more likely to engage in
derivatives activity than smaller firms and that stock insurers are more likely to use derivatives
than mutuals. The former finding is consistent with the banking literature and is usually attributed
to economies of scale in human capital investments associated with derivatives. The CH finding
with respect to stocks is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis (see Mayers and
Smith, 1988) that stocks have a comparative advantage in conducting more complex and/or risky
16types of insurance business than mutuals because owners can more easily monitor and control
management in the stock form of ownership, reducing agency costs. The tendency of stocks to
conduct more complex or risky types of business, in turn, implies that stocks have more reason to
use derivatives for hedging than mutuals and also are likely to have a comparative advantage in
acting as derivatives dealers.
CH also find that the use of OBS contracts is positively related to measures of interest rate
risk exposure. They also find that insurers domiciled in states prohibiting investment of general
account funds in futures or options are less likely to engage in these OBS activities, but that usage
is more likely for firms in these states as the level of separate account assets increases.
We extend the work of CH in a number of dimensions. First, in addition to studying the
determinants of derivatives usage in general, we also investigate factors influencing the use of
various types of derivatives such as options, swaps and futures. Second, whereas CH based their
analysis on life insurers licensed in Georgia, our sample includes the universe of insurers reporting
to the NAIC. Thus, we analyze derivatives usage by property-casualty (PC) insurers, as well as
life insurers, and conduct a separate analysis of insurance groups as well as studying individual
companies. We believe that these extensions are important to isolate the rationales for derivatives
use across organizations with substantial cross-sectional variation in risk/return profiles.
Hypotheses
We have a number of hypotheses, some of them taken from earlier work, regarding the
factors that influence derivatives instrument choices and year-end exposure decisions. At the
overall participation level, we expect size to be positively related to OBS activity if there are
17significant economies of scale in human capital investment and derivatives trading (Booth, Smith
and Stolz, 1984, Hoyt, 1989). However, these scale economies, if they exist, may be offset by the
fact that larger insurers may be more diversified and therefore in less need of OBS contracts as
additional risk management tools. This potentially negative relationship is, however, predicated
on the idea that OBS activities are almost solely for purposes of hedging. Our overall expectation
is that information/transactions cost economies of scale will dominate any built in diversification
benefits, resulting in greater usage by larger insurers.
Organizational form, i.e., the mutual vs. stock form of ownership, is another potential
determinant of variability in the use of OBS instruments among insurers. The managerial
discretion hypothesis suggests that stocks are expected to engage in more OBS activity than
mutuals because stocks are more likely to be involved in complex and/or risky lines of business
that give rise to the need for hedging. However, the use of derivatives by stock insurers is also
likely to hinge on whether OBS activities are beneficial to stockholders and the degree to which
stockholders are able to align managers’ interests with their own. Conventional theory would
suggest that hedging is not beneficial to stockholders and thus that the existence of corporate
hedging is evidence of agency costs. However, more recent work (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein, 1993, and Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993) suggests that hedging may be a way to
control certain types of incentive or principal-agent problems or otherwise enhance value if
markets are incomplete, and thus may benefit stockholders. Smith and Stulz (1985) hypothesized
that firms faced with a convex tax schedule could reduce expected taxes, and therefore increase
firm value, by lowering the volatility of its taxable earnings stream.
18Another organizational variable of some interest involves line of business specialization.
Life insurers are generally believed to have higher interest rate risk exposure than their PC
counterparts because there is an investment component in many life insurance contracts and
policyholders are interest rate sensitive. Interest rate sensitivity has increased over the past
twenty years with the introduction of universal life insurance, variable life insurance, and various
types of new annuity products. Participation in the market for guaranteed investment contracts
(GICs) provides another source of interest rate risk exposure for many life insurers. Property-
casualty insurers’ liabilities are also rate sensitive in the sense that their fair value reflects the
present value of future loss cash flows. However, PC insurers’ liabilities are generally shorter-
term than those of life insurance, and PC insurers do not face the risk of disintermediation, such as
the risk that policyholders will surrender policies or withdraw funds to take advantage of
investments offering more attractive yields.
Both life and PC insurers also face interest rate risk on the asset side of the balance sheet
because a large percentage of their investments are in rate sensitive long-term fixed income
obligations. There have been few studies of the duration of insurer assets and liabilities, but the
existing literature suggests that the equity of many insurers is subject to a positive duration gap
(e.g., Cummins and Weiss, 1991, Staking and Babbel, 1995). Because financial statement data
are not sufficient to permit duration to be estimated, we use asset maturity and liability mix as
proxies. We would expect larger maturity duration gaps to be associated with higher usage of
OBS contracts that allow insurers to transfer this interest rate volatility.
To measure interest rate risk exposure due to asset holdings, we are able to disaggregate
the bond portfolio into publicly traded and privately placed bonds and also to disaggregate into
19four general categories of bond instruments -- CMOs, loan backed bonds, other structured bonds,
and non-loan-backed bonds. The disaggregation allows us to account for differential exposure of
the major bond categories to interest rate and liquidity risk. For example, insurers may use
derivatives to hedge the liquidity risk of privately placed bonds, and higher usage rates may also
be associated with holdings of CMOs due to the potential for thinness of trading during periods of
high rate volatility and due to the negative convexity of these instruments.
In a similar fashion, one would want to account for the degree of market risk exposure
the institution faces, via its holdings of equity and/or exchange rate risk. We control for these
factors by including variables that measure the overall percentage of investment in equity
securities. We would expect equity holdings to be positively associated with derivative usage if
the insurer’s motivation is to hedge this equity exposure or to enhance their income by writing
covered calls (see footnote 3). By looking at the purchase and sale of some contracts we can ask
whether the demand is for the purchase or sale of volatility-altering contracts such as options.
Similar arguments can be made for foreign exchange exposure. Larger positions in foreign
securities and/or the existence of foreign based subsidiaries may generate a demand for selling this
volatility, presumably through forward and futures markets for foreign exchange (parts C and D
of Schedule DB). To the extent that insurers are not typically major market makers, one would
expect to find little evidence of selling volatility through options (part B of Schedule DB).
Residual equity exposure would presumably be managed in a fashion similar to that of domestic
securities and should carry a similar sign.
20Although the use of derivatives by most insurers is a relatively recent phenomenon,
9
insurers have long used reinsurance as a way of hedging underwriting risk and more recently have
used financial reinsurance to hedge interest rate exposure and other types of financial risk (Tiller
and Tiller, 1995). We account for the use of reinsurance by including in our regressions the ratio
of ceded reinsurance premiums written to direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed.
10 If
there is a significant relationship between underwriting risk and returns in financial markets, then
reinsurance designed to reduce underwriting risk might serve as a substitute for OBS activities.
Financial reinsurance is more likely to be a substitute for OBS transactions but this type of
reinsurance is a relatively recent product that is imperfectly proxied by our reinsurance variable.
On the other hand, reinsurance and financial derivatives might be complements if insurers that
engage in hedging of underwriting risk are also more likely to hedge financial risk.
To account for differences in business mix across insurers, we use a set of variables
reflecting specialization in various PC and life/health lines of insurance. For PC insurers we
include variables that reflect specialization in long and short-tail lines of business. As discussed
above, the fair value of insurer liabilities reflects the discounted value of the loss cash flows.
Thus, interest rate changes have a more pronounced effect on the fair value of liabilities in long-
tail lines than in short-tail lines. Because PC insurers are heavily invested in long-term bonds,
long-tail liabilities may serve in part as a natural hedge against interest rate risk exposure from the
bond portfolio to the extent that the fair value of these liabilities is inversely related to interest
rates. Thus, we might expect PC insurers with higher proportions of long-tail liabilities to be less
likely to engage in derivatives transactions designed to manage interest rate risk. On the other
9Lehman Brothers (1994) reports that some of the more sophisticated insurers have been using derivatives for more
than twenty years. However, only a few large insurers fall into this category.
10This measure of reinsurance is also used by Colquitt and Hoyt (1995) and Mayers and Smith (1990).hand, short-tail liabilities are not as sensitive to interest rates and thus PC insurers with relatively
large positions in the short-tail lines may be more likely to hedge interest rate risk through the use
of derivatives.
Cash value life insurance policies, individual annuities and group annuities are generally
associated with higher interest rate risk than policies (such as term life and group life) that
primarily protect against mortality risk. Cash value life insurance and annuities incorporate a
variety of options that expose insurers to prepayment and disintermediation risk due to
competition from other financial intermediaries such as banks and mutual funds. Thus, we expect
insurers with relatively large cash value life insurance and annuity reserves to be more likely to use
derivatives to manage risk.
As a final control variable, we use a regulatory dummy set equal to 1 if the company is
domiciled in a state that prohibits general account funds from being invested in certain OBS
contracts and to 0 otherwise. We would expect this variable to carry a negative sign in the
empirical specification if the more restrictive regulatory environment is not already captured by
our measures of such factors as equity market participation and other investment restrictions that
may be formally or informally imposed by states that wish to limit insurers’ positions in activities
that regulators feel are excessively risky.
Absent accounting, regulatory, or information effects, the same factors associated with
positions during the year should retain explanatory power for end of year holdings. However, to
the extent that there is different regulatory treatment for the use of derivatives across life and PC
underwriters, one would expect to see institutions that are less penalized, for example in terms of
risk based capital requirements, engage in more derivatives usage. For example, because the life
insurer risk-based capital formula includes a charge for the use of swaps, whereas the property-
22casualty formula includes no charges for derivatives, life insurers may be less likely than PC
insurers to hold non-zero swap positions at year-end.
There may also exist accounting reasons for end of year positions that differ from those
found on an average day during the year. Widely held stock corporations, for example, must
report financial condition information to both state regulatory agencies and the SEC, the latter on
a quarterly basis. Mutual insurers, on the other hand, have fewer external reporting requirements.
To the extent that the more widely dispersed information on stock insurers is impounded into
their stock prices, repositioning outstanding contracts in the year-end reports would not yield
positive value. Because mutuals have fewer disclosure requirements (and the fact that regulatory
calculations apply to year end balances), mutuals have more opportunity to manage any
informational transfers associated with reporting reflections of the underlying risk of the cash
flows. There may be other reasons, beyond any associated with capital requirements, that would
encourage institutions to alter year end positions, e.g., “window dressing.”
5. Determinants of Derivatives Usage: Results
Users and Non-Users: Summary Statistics
Tables 11 and 12 focus on the asset and liability portfolios of insurers as well as their use
of reinsurance and other company characteristics. The tables reveal that PC insurers tend to hold
higher proportions of their portfolios in stocks than do life insurers, whereas life insurers invest
more in CMOs, privately placed bonds, and real estate and mortgages than do PC insurers. Both
types of insurers are heavily invested in publicly traded bonds. The average maturities of life
insurers’ bond portfolios are higher than for PC firms.
23Life insurers that use derivatives invest more in mortgages, real estate, and privately
placed bonds than non-users, and have proportionately more GICs, individual life insurance
reserves, and group annuity reserves than non-users. PC derivatives users hold proportionately
more stocks, CMOs and loan backed bonds than non-users. Both life and PC insurers that use
derivatives have less of their portfolios in cash and short-term investments than non-users,
suggesting that derivatives are being used to manage liquidity risk by generating cash flows when
interest rates are moving in directions that either reduce the market value of the firm’s assets or
increase the market value of the firm’s liabilities.
Multi-Variate Modeling
Although the averages provide some intriguing suggestive evidence relating to our
hypotheses on the use of derivatives by insurers, multivariate methods are needed to provide more
definitive answers. Accordingly, we estimate probit models of derivative usage with a dependent
variable equal to 1 if the insurer uses derivatives and equal to 0 otherwise. We estimate models
for overall derivatives usage and for each of the five major categories of derivatives
transactions/holdings reported in Schedule DB. The probit models are estimated using maximum
likelihood methods. Logit and Gompit models also were estimated, with similar results. For a
discussion of probit, see Greene (1990).
The use of multivariate statistical models, such as our probit model, provides important
insights into the influence of the independent variables (insurer characteristics) on the dependent
variable (derivatives use or non-use) that cannot be obtained from tables of averages and are also
difficult to extract from cross-tabulations. In effect, the multivariate models allow one to focus on
the influence of each variable, after controlling for the influence of all other variables in the
24equation. The influence of each independent variable is measured by its sign and magnitude as
well as the statistical significance of its coefficient, as discussed below. The importance of
controlling for other possibly influential factors when evaluating the effect of a specific variable
involves the idea that the variable in question may appear to be important (unimportant) when
considered in isolation but may be unimportant (important) after controlling for other potentially
influential insurer characteristics.
In interpreting the probit results, the reader should keep in mind that the dependent
variable equals 1 if an insurer uses derivatives and equals 0 if the insurer does not use derivatives.
Thus, variables with positive coefficients are associated with the use of derivatives and variables
with negative coefficients are associated with non-use. It is also worth reiterating that the
dependent variable is set equal to 1 if the insurer showed any activity in sections 1 through 3 of
parts A through D of Schedule DB, i.e., the insurer is counted as a derivatives user if it reported
year-end derivative positions, if it opened derivatives positions during the year, or if it closed
derivative positions during the year.
To give the reader an idea of how well the empirical specification explains the variability
of the dependent variable, the likelihood ratio index has been calculated for each probit equation.
The likelihood ratio index ranges from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted in a similar manner to the R
2
statistic reported in ordinary least squares regressions. For a more technical discussion of the
likelihood ratio index see Maddala (1983).
Probit Results: Life Insurers
This section reports results for individual life/health insurance companies, i.e., each
company is treated as a separate observation unit whether or not it is a member of a group. To
25control for group affiliation, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer is a member of
a group in which at least one other group member is active in derivatives. A dummy variable is
also included for unaffiliated single companies. Thus, the category not represented by a dummy
variable consists of members of groups where at most one group member is active in derivatives.
The life/health insurer results, presented in Table 13, show clearly that size (measured by
the natural logarithm of assets) is a strong determinant of the use of derivatives. Thus, like earlier
authors, we find evidence consistent with the existence of significant economies of scale in human
and fixed capital. The findings imply a minimum size before OBS activities become viable from a
cost perspective. Reinforcing this finding, an insurer is much more likely to use derivatives if it is
a member of a group in which at least one other insurer engages in OBS transactions. This is
intuitively appealing to the extent that, if one member of the group is involved, then the marginal
cost of other group members taking advantage of the risk/return opportunities afforded by OBS
contracts is declining to the extent that each member of the group rationally does not duplicate
these fixed costs.
Life insurer involvement in derivatives is also correlated with the degree of reinsurance, as
Colquitt and Hoyt found. However, it is noteworthy that it is significantly positively correlated
with the writing of options, caps and floors and with the reporting of counterparty exposure at
year-end but not with the use of other types of derivatives. To the extent that most life insurers
have positive equity duration gaps, writing call options on bonds may be a complement to
reinsurance for flattening out the relationship between interest rates and equity value. However, at
this point we cannot rule out the possibility that life insurers are taking on more volatility in OBS
contracts (e.g., by writing bond and equity calls) as they simultaneously use reinsurance markets
to sell off the financial risk component of their life insurance claims. The purchase of derivatives
26contracts also seems to be correlated with the average maturity of publicly traded bonds. This
could again be viewed as an attempt to shorten the duration of equity by purchasing interest rate
caps and/or buying put options on long term bonds.
Interestingly, the use of swaps and futures contracts is highly correlated with the
percentage of CMO’s (particularly those that are privately placed) and the percentage of GIC’s
issued by the institution. One interpretation of these results is that life and health institutions are
hedging the duration gap between privately placed CMO’s, that may look attractive because of
their yields, but may have poor liquidity, and GIC’s, which are typically shorter term and
reasonably rate sensitive. It is, of course, possible that some of these (short) positions (e.g.,
futures) are also attempts to dynamically hedge the convexity risk displayed by CMO’s. A final
possibility for the positive CMO-derivatives correlation may be the similarity of analytical
capabilities required to successfully manage this asset class and incorporate derivatives into the
firm’s investment strategies.
We also note that the percentage of reserves held as individual life reserves is positively
related to the use of derivatives; in particular swap contracts, which mainly consist of interest rate
swaps for life insurers. To the extent that individual life reserves represent interest sensitive
instruments, their behavior may mirror to some extent that displayed by GIC’s, which are also
highly correlated with the use of swaps.
Finally, stock insurers are somewhat more likely to report year-end counter-party
exposure than mutuals, as expected, if mutuals can exploit information asymmetries to gain value
by year-end balance sheet window-dressing. This finding also would be consistent with the
managerial discretion hypothesis, also as expected, if our asset or reserve categories do not fully
capture the differences between stock and mutual asset and product portfolios.
27Probit Results: Property-Casualty Insurers
Results for the probit regressions that focus only on PC insurers (shown in Table 14)
provide a number of similarities, but also a number of sharp contrasts, when compared to results
for their life insurer counterparts. Similar to life insurers, and for what we suppose are very similar
reasons, both size and group affiliation with an OBS user are positively associated with the use of
derivatives by PC companies.
There also appears to be a tendency for unaffiliated single firms to use derivatives,
particularly in terms of writing caps, floors and options. The greater use of derivatives by
unaffiliated insurers may reflect the fact that they forfeit a source of diversification by not being
organized as a group and thus may have a greater need to hedge through the use of derivatives.
An insurance group is similar to a portfolio of options, worth more to the owners than an option
on a portfolio. Under corporate law, the creditors of an insolvent subsidiary cannot reach the
assets of other members of the group unless they are successful in “piercing the corporate veil,”
which usually requires a finding of fraud or similar wrong-doing by the group’s owners. The
portfolio of options effect may be stronger for PC insurers than for life insurers because PC
insurers are more exposed to volatility from their underwriting operations whereas the
underwriting risk exposure of life insurers is minimal. Thus, the option to fail may be worth more
to PC insurers, motivating PC insurers that are not members of groups to engage in other types of
risk management.
There are several important contrasts between the life insurer and PC insurer results. First,
we note that the percentage of assets held in stocks is strongly positively related to the use of
derivatives by PC insurers but is not a significant determinant of the use of derivatives by life
insurers. More specifically, stocks held are positively associated with the writing and buying of
28options by PC insurers. The strong relationship with writing calls and/or buying puts is consistent
with covered call and “dividend capture” strategies.
11 The fact that end of the year counterparty
exposure is not related to the level of stock holdings provides some auxiliary evidence that these
positions may not be carried over from year to year. (Recall from Tables 5 and 5a that the
number of insurers showing within-year equity call option transactions is much larger than the
number showing end-of-year positions in these contracts.)
Second, the relationship between real estate holdings and the use of OBS contracts differs
between PC and life companies. For life insurers, real estate is significantly negatively related to
the use of swaps but is not related to the use of other types of derivatives. This makes sense to the
extent that real estate values are less sensitive to interest rate changes than, say, a fixed income
security; hence the lower need for swap contracts as a risk management tool. For PC companies,
on the other hand, real estate holdings are positively associated with the purchase and sale of
options but not associated with swaps.
A third contrast between PC and life insurers is the relationship between reinsurance and
OBS contracts. For PC insurers, the use of reinsurance is inversely related to the writing of
options. This result contrasts sharply with that reported for life insurers. One interpretation of this
result is consistent with the hypothesis that PC insurers that choose to focus on the generation of
income, as opposed to risk management, can accomplish this task by writing options, for which
they receive a fee, and simultaneously abstaining from the (potentially costly) reinsurance of their
liabilities.
11Dividend capture is a covered call strategy that involves the purchase of the security for the sole purpose of
receiving the dividend. By simultaneously writing a call option, the insurer is protected should the ex-dividend price fall
by more than the amount of the dividend.
29Writing long-tail commercial policies (general liability and workers’ compensation
insurance) seems to be associated with a lower likelihood of being party to OBS contracts,
particularly swaps. This would be consistent with the interpretation of long-tail liabilities as a
natural hedge for interest rate risk in the asset portfolio, thus reducing the need for interest rate
risk management.
A somewhat puzzling finding is the positive relationship between auto physical damage
insurance and OBS activity, specifically the writing of options. Based on similar reasoning as in
the long-tail commercial case, OBS transactions might be related to the short-tailed auto physical
damage line because the fair value of liabilities in this line is mostly unaffected by changes in
interest rates. OBS transactions may be related to short tail auto physical damage to the extent
that heavy reliance on these typically short term contracts results ceteris paribus in a larger equity
duration gap. Another possible explanation is that auto physical damage tends to be a relatively
profitable line of business. Thus, a concentration in auto physical damage may be complementary
to other income enhancing strategies like the writing of covered call, discussed earlier.
Probit Results: Groups and Unaffiliated Single Companies
At a general level, the group results mirror, to a large extent, the results reported for the
individual life and PC insurers. Large groups and those with relatively heavy exposure in stocks
and/or GIC’s, tend to be heavily involved in OBS activities; the former in writing options and the
latter in swap contracts. Substantial investments in long term privately placed bonds are again
correlated with the writing of options, caps and floors.
Life premiums ceded and individual life reserves remain correlated with derivatives usage,
with the former being related to both the writing and purchase of options, caps and collars. In the
30group models, high levels of group annuity reserves are also associated with a high likelihood of
derivatives usage, particularly the purchase of option type contracts. To the extent that these are
interest sensitive accounts, the writing of interest rate floors or call options on bonds to fund the
purchase of, say, interest rate caps makes some sense from the perspective of self-financing
interest rate risk strategies. This would again tend to flatten out the equity/interest rate
relationship, for which there is some evidence that the insurer earns a high reward/risk ratio
(Staking and Babbel, 1995).
We note that the writing of auto physical damage policies retains a strong positive
association with the writing of option type contracts, while long-term privately placed CMO’s are
associated with a high probability of futures activity (duration hedging) and the purchase of option
type contracts (e.g., puts and calls or caps and floors) in an effort to hedge the negative convexity
of these contracts.
Finally, the dummy variable for states that prohibit insurers from using derivatives was
insignificant and was eliminated from the final versions of the regressions. This finding, which is
contrary to the Colquitt-Hoyt results, may be due to the fact that their sample consisted of life
insurers licensed in Georgia, which is one of the states that prohibits domestic companies from
using derivatives. Because few major insurers are domiciled in the prohibiting states, the result
may disappear in our larger sample. It is also possible that our larger set of control variables
absorbs the regulatory effect.
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12The omission of the regulatory variable had no noticeable effect on the coefficients of the other variables in the
probit models.6. Conclusions
Like other types of financial and non-financial firms, insurers are increasingly using
financial derivatives to manage risk. Although the overall proportion of all insurers using
derivatives remains small, derivatives use has become widespread among firms in the largest size
quartile. The proportion of life insurers using derivatives is higher than the proportion of PC
users, but the number of life and PC firms using derivatives is approximately equal.
Interest rate swaps, caps, and floors and bond futures are the types of contracts used by
the largest number of life insurers reporting year-end derivatives positions in their financial
statements, consistent with the use of such contracts by life companies to manage interest rate
risk. Some life insurers also tend to write substantial amounts of bond calls and puts during the
year, little of which remains open at the end of the year. Life insurers are also actively trading
foreign currency forwards. For PC insurers, the contracts used by the largest number of insurers
are equity calls written, foreign currency forwards, and equity puts purchased. Based on
transactions during the year, a substantial volume of notional principle in the PC industry also
arises from positions in equity options and short positions in bond futures and equity futures.
An overall conclusion is that life insurers are using derivatives primarily to manage interest rate
and exchange rate risk, while PC insurers are active in equity and foreign exchange derivatives
markets.
In addition to number of insurers trading in derivatives markets and the volume of notional
principal, we also conduct a probit analysis of the determinants of the use of derivatives by
insurers. Consistent with prior research on insurers and banks, we find evidence consistent with
significant economies of scale affecting the use of derivatives. Large firms are much more likely
to use derivatives than smaller firms. Reinforcing this finding, insurers that are members of
32groups where at least one other group member uses derivatives are significantly more likely to
engage in derivatives trading.
We also find evidence consistent with the use of derivatives to manage the positive
duration gap that tends to characterize insurer equity. For example, insurers that write more
GICs and hold more individual life reserves and annuity reserves are more likely to use
derivatives. Bond portfolio maturity is also positively correlated with the use of derivatives, and
there is evidence that insurers tend to use derivatives to hedge the risk of CMOs and privately
placed bonds. Insurers also appear to be using derivatives as part of equity income enhancement
strategies and to manage convexity risk.
Interestingly, we find that PC insurers who write more short-tail auto physical damage
insurance are more likely to use derivatives than those writing long-tail commercial liability and
workers’ compensation insurance. We also find that the level of reinsurance is inversely related to
the use of derivatives by PC insurers, which is the opposite of what we, and Colquitt and Hoyt
before us, find for life insurers. Specifically, we find that it is derivatives usage in the form of
writing options that is correlated with reinsurance for both PC and life insurers, but with different
signs. Unfortunately, at the level of aggregation used in this study, we are unable to distinguish
between the hypotheses that one or the other of these types of insurers is using derivatives as a
complement or substitute for risk taking on the balance sheet. The problem is that the writing of
options, caps, and floors can be used either to reduce risk or increase income. Investigating the
source of the demand by insurers for these contracts is a major priority in our plans for future
research.
We also find significant differences between positions taken during the year and positions
that remain open at the end of the year. In particular, stock companies seem to display little
33difference between within-year and end-of-year positions, while mutuals display more end-of-year
variation vis a vis their positions during the year. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
prices are at least partially revealing and therefore that managers of stock corporations have less
incentive to engage in management of end-of-year positions. Stock companies in general tend to
engage in more derivatives trading, a result that is consistent with the managerial discretion
hypothesis.
We have been able to report on the universe of insurers that report derivatives usage in
Schedule DB in this paper. Unfortunately, this may understate the actual amount of activity there
is in financial instruments with embedded derivative features. In particular, structured notes,
which are fixed income securities with derivative characteristics, provide insurers a way to utilize
derivatives in their investment strategies without having to specifically identify their usage. For
example, an insurer could purchase a 5 year structured note for which the coupon rate is tied to
movements in the S&P 500 index instead of the more conventional fixed rate coupon. This
security combines a 5 year “plain vanilla” bond with an embedded swap contract paying fixed and
receiving the return on the S&P 500 index. Under statutory accounting rules, this type of
instrument is reported in Schedule D of the annual statement, but Schedule D does not provide
enough detail to distinguish this bond from bonds that do not have embedded derivatives.
Investigating the popularity of these investments and determining what effect their existence may
have on an insurer’s decisions to participate directly in derivative markets is clearly an avenue for
future research that should be pursued.
More work also needs to be done on the question of whether the regularities that we find
in these data are primarily related to efforts to flatten the relationship between insurer surplus
value and financial market prices or, alternatively, are related to strategies involving what might
34be called “covered” income strategies such as the dividend capture hypothesis outlined in this
paper. This is a topic for future research that will hopefully enable us to shed light on the issue of
whether usage of some contracts is associated with risk reduction, while other contracts may be
used to enhance income while keeping additional risk exposure at a minimum.
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